Why Did Kennedy Push for More Conventional Weapons?
President John F. Kennedy’s push for more conventional weapons during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 has long been a topic of debate among historians and scholars. Many believe that Kennedy’s actions during the crisis were driven by the desire to avoid nuclear war, while others argue that he was motivated by other factors. In this article, we will examine the reasons behind Kennedy’s push for more conventional weapons during the crisis.
The Emergence of the Crisis
Prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States had been concerned about the build-up of Soviet nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in Cuba. In August 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the USSR would deploy nuclear-capable missiles to the island of Cuba, just 90 miles from the United States. This move was a direct challenge to American President John F. Kennedy and his administration.
A New Era of Threat Assessment
The Cuban Missile Crisis marked a new era of threat assessment in international politics. The crisis revealed the possibility of a full-blown nuclear war, as the United States and Soviet Union were now engaged in a direct confrontation over Soviet missiles in Cuba. For the first time in the history of international relations, the world was confronted with the possibility of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The crisis also led to a re-evaluation of the role of conventional and nuclear weapons in military conflict.
The Rise of Conventional Weapons
With the emergence of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, traditional notions of military conflict became less relevant. New strategic thinking began to emerge, focusing on the role of conventional force in deterring aggressive behavior. Kennedy recognized the need for a stronger emphasis on conventional weapons as part of the overall American national security strategy.
Fear of Nuclear War
Some argue that Kennedy’s motivation for pushing for more conventional weapons was to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. The Kennedy Administration believed that the Soviets may not have intended to commit an act of aggression or escalate the crisis further once they had deployed their missile capabilities. However, fear of the prospect of nuclear war drove Washington to seek a negotiated outcome, which led to increased attention on conventional options to achieve this goal.
Other Factors Influencing Decision-Making
Politicization of the issue also played a crucial role in shaping Kennedy’s decisions. The pressure to appear strong and proactive in the face of Soviet aggression, coupled with domestic politics (the upcoming midterm elections and the ongoing campaign) influenced political calculus. This perceived need to demonstrate decisive and robust action contributed to an emphasis on conventional forces. Furthermore, American commitments in Southeast Asia and Asia, particularly in South Korea, Vietnam, and South Vietnam, heightened interest in conventional military options for countering communist advances, thus reinforcing the value placed on conventional weapons.
| Conventional Arms Used During the Crisis |
|---|
| Military forces |
| * 1,400 troops on Vieques Island |
| * 1,500 at the Guantanamo Naval Base |
| * 40 squadrons of fighter aircraft ready for deployment |
| Naval capabilities |
| * Task forces 82 and 126 were deployed |
| * USS Rosevelt and Falcon aircraft carriers anchored offshore |
| * Anti-submarine and torpedo ships were sent to key positions |
Military Prerequisites for a Potential Quagmire
When examining the reasons behind Kennedy’s push for more conventional weapons, it becomes increasingly apparent that the primary rationale was to provide diplomatic space for a peaceful settlement. Kennedy knew that an all-out attack against Soviet missile sites could ignite a nuclear war and preferred a more measured response involving conventional force posture and diplomatic engagement to ensure a negotiated solution was possible.
Key Turning Points
- Quarantine Resolution, October 22, 1962: The first significant step in responding to the crisis, a strict naval blockade or quarantine was enforced on all Soviet ships and missile-laden vessels entering and leaving Cuba.
- Soviet-Nuclear-Backed Red Lines: Kennedy acknowledged in public statements that a possible war could be initiated even with conventional forces.
- The Incomparable Power of Atomic Fists: Kennedy demonstrated recognition of the power dynamics as nuclear weapons held by one side (the US). Kennedy’s statements suggested acknowledging Soviet nuclear capabilities were aimed at deterring conflict more effectively.
After the Crisis
In the weeks and months following the missile crisis, the world experienced an unprecedented era of military-political cooperation between Soviet Union and the United States as the Cuban missile crisis led to improved cooperation between the two nations during the Cold War era (see Table 1). Kennedy’s recognition that nuclear war was unproportionate to Soviet deployment and the emphasis on military planning for a full conflict drove the shift from brinksmanship to diplomatic accommodation for resolution.
| Immediate Outcomes and Longer-Lasting Consequences
|-|
| Long-term Consequences |
| Red Phone established | No nuclear war during crisis |
| Risk-reduction measures, summit, and détente |
| Mimicked in future diplomatic contexts, e.g., Cold|
| Wage
| Arab-Israeli conflict**
Throughout this article, it’s become clear that President John F. Kennedy’s efforts to push for more conventional weapons during the Cuban Missile Crisis were driven by his commitment to preventing a direct conflict with the Soviet Union, as well as pragmatic political considerations. As strategic thinking evolved, it further underscored the crucial relevance of conventional forces as counterbalancing elements within defense policy.
